Home as a Legal Concept
D. Benjamin Barros*
ABSTRACT
This article, which is the first comprehensive discussion of the
American legal concept of home, makes two major contributions. First, the
article systematically examines how homes are treated more favorably than
other types of property in a wide range of legal contexts, including criminal
law and procedure, torts, privacy, landlord-tenant, debtor-creditor, family
law, and income taxation. Second, the article considers the normative issue
of whether this favorable treatment is justified. The article draws from
material on the psychological concept of home and the cultural history of
home throughout this analysis, providing insight into the interests at stake in
various legal issues involving the home.
The article concludes that homes are different from other types of
property and give rise to legal interests deserving of special legal protection,
but that these interests can be outweighed by competing interests in
particular legal contexts. The result is that in many contexts special legal
treatment of homes is justified. In other contexts, for example residential
rent control, the strength of competing interests means that the law
overprotects the home. In still other contexts, for example eminent domain
law as embodied by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. New
London, the law tends to underprotect the home.
INTRODUCTION
“Home” is a powerful and rich word in the English language. As our
cultural cliché “a house is not a home” suggests, “home” means far more
than a physical structure. “Home” evokes thoughts of, among many other
things, family, safety, privacy, and community. In the United States, home
and home ownership are held in high cultural esteem, as American as apple
pie and baseball. With our society’s evolution beyond its agrarian origins,
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the home has replaced land as the dominant form of American property.1
As a result, we have developed something of an ideology of home, where
the protection of home and all it stands for is an American virtue.2
This Article is about the legal concept of home and how homes often are
treated more favorably by the law than other types of property. Houses are
explicitly protected by the Third and Fourth Amendments to the
Constitution,3 and homes are given more protection than other types of
property, such as cars, in search and seizure law.4 The federal tax code
strongly favors homeownership over home rental and ownership of other
types of property.5 Post-foreclosure rights of redemption and just cause
eviction statutes protect the possession of a home in debtor-creditor law and
landlord-tenant law.6 Other examples abound.
On a general level, special legal treatment of homes is neither surprising
nor controversial. Homes are different in meaningful ways from other types
of property, and their unique nature in many circumstances justifies a
favored legal status. This Article, however, seeks to move beyond the
intuitive and cultural-ideological sense that homes are unique, and to
examine in more detail whether and why homes are deserving of favored
treatment in different legal contexts.
To do so, this Article breaks the legal concept of home into component
parts, organizing legal issues involving the home into two general
categories: those relating to safety, freedom and privacy, and those relating
to possession. To gain insight into the interests involved in various legal
contexts, this Article also draws throughout its analysis on materials from
the cultural history of home and the psychology of home.7 Ideas of home,
privacy and family as currently understood evolved together in the late
Middle Ages, and this cultural history is relevant to issues in privacy law
and family law. Similarly, ideas like privacy, security, family and
1
See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, at 4 (2001) (noting that for most Americans
their home is their most valuable asset).
2
See, e.g., Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 326-27 (1998) (discussing the
American ideology of home); CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE, 72 (1977) (quoting Calvin
Coolidge: “No greater contribution could be made to the stability of the Nation, and the advancement of its
ideals, than to make it a Nation of homeowning families.”).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent
of the Owner . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
4
See infra Part I.B.
5
See infra notes 162 - 165 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 98 - 104 and accompanying text.
7
The literature on the psychology of home is dominated by theoretical essays, and there are relatively few
empirical studies that have looked into the psychological relationship of actual people to their actual homes. See
Sandy G. Smith, The Essential Qualities of A Home, 14 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 31, 31 (1994) (providing both review of
the theoretical literature and the results of an empirical study); J. Tognoli, Residential Environments, in
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 655 (D. Stokois & I Altman eds., 1987). By-and-large, however,
the theory and empirical evidence are consistent, and it is possible to identify broad themes about how people
relate to their homes on a psychological level. These themes are incorporated into the discussion that follows.
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continuity are deeply rooted in the psychology of home (which reflects and
reinforces the values inherent in the contemporary cultural idea of the
home), and unsurprisingly are reflected in many of the unique legal
protections given to the home.
Following the structure outlined above, Part I examines home as a
source of security, liberty and privacy. These interests, encapsulated in the
common-law maxim “A man’s home is his castle,” are implicated in a
group of related areas of law where homes clearly are favored over other
types of property. For example, in tort law and criminal law, acts of selfhelp in the defense of a home are expressly privileged in most jurisdictions.
Homes also are given favored treatment in search and seizure law, and the
importance of the sanctity of the home to the Founders is reflected in the
language of the Fourth Amendment. The idea of home is tied intimately to
cultural ideas of privacy, and unsurprisingly homes are given favored
treatment in privacy law. In all of these areas, the protection given to
homes has limits – the government, for example, may intrude into the
private sphere of the home in a number of contexts if it has a strong reason
to do so. Notwithstanding those limits, the pervasiveness of the special
treatment of homes in these contexts suggests the existence of a strong
cultural consensus that homes are uniquely important when issues of safety,
autonomy and privacy are at stake.
Part II discusses the personal connection between individuals and their
homes in the context of legal issues involving the possession of homes. It
begins with an analysis of the strength of the personal possessory interest in
a home – that is, the interest of a person in staying in possession of a
particular home in a particular place. This analysis uses as a starting point
Margaret Jane Radin’s personhood theory, which argues that the possession
of homes should be favored against competing interests on the basis of an
intuitive view that people become personally connected to their homes.
Looking in part to the psychology of home, this analysis suggests that while
the personal possessory interest in the home is real and deserving of legal
protection, it is not as strong as Radin’s intuitive view would suggest.
Part II then examines a series of legal issues involving the possession of
a home, weighing in each circumstance the relative strength of the
possessory interest in the home against competing interests. Some areas of
landlord-tenant law (for example, just cause eviction statutes) and debtorcreditor law (for example, post-foreclosure rights of redemption) strike an
appropriate balance between the possessory interest in the home and
competing interests. Other areas of law, particularly residential rent control
and certain homestead exemptions, tilt the scale too far in favor of the
resident’s interest in possession. Still other areas of law, notably eminent
domain law and the post-divorce property distribution rules applicable in
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some jurisdictions, underprotect the personal interest in the home.
Part III focuses on the normative issue of whether homes that do not fit
the archetypal single-family owner-occupied suburban home should be
treated differently by the law than homes that do fit the archetype. The
obvious answer in most circumstances is “no,” and “home” as used in this
Article unless otherwise qualified includes any type of permanent dwelling,
whether rented or owned, and whether occupied by one person or by a
family or group of any sort. In some circumstances, however, a justifiable
distinction may be made between owned and rented homes. For example,
disparate treatment makes sense in legal issues that concern the inherent
difference between freehold estates and tenancies.
In some other
circumstances, policies favoring ownership – such as the treatment of
mortgage interest and capital gains on homes by the Internal Revenue Code
– may be justified on the republican ground that homeowners are more
involved citizens than home renters. The mere existence of these
justifications, however, does not mean that favoritism of ownership is
warranted in a particular circumstance. Disparate tax treatment of owned
and rented homes can have negative consequences that may outweigh the
benefits of encouraging ownership.
The overarching conclusion of this Article is that while homes are
different from other types of property, the unique nature of the home
justifies additional legal protection in some, but not all, circumstances. The
result for any particular legal issue depends on the relative strength of the
interests in the home as measured against competing interests. In many
areas of the law, such as those involving freedom and privacy, the
additional legal protection given to homes is justified by their unique
nature. In some other areas, however, a close analysis reveals that the law
overprotects or underprotects the home. In each case, striking the correct
balance requires consideration of only the interests in the home relevant to
the issue at hand, rather than the entirety of a broader intuitive or
ideological conception of the home.
I. HOME AS CASTLE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND PRIVACY
One of the most pervasive clichés in the common law is that a man’s
home is his castle. The protection of liberty is a key element generally in
Western theories of property,8 but the castle doctrine encapsulates the idea
that homes are different from other types of property when issues of
personal security, freedom and privacy are at stake. The pervasiveness of
the castle doctrine and of the special treatment of homes by the law in these
8
See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW __, __ n.1 (2005) (collecting
examples of liberal theories of property).

DRAFT-8/12/ 2005

HOME AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

5

areas are reflective of a cultural consensus for protecting homes as unique
zones of individual safety, autonomy and privacy. Indeed, the modern idea
of the home developed hand-in-hand with the modern idea of privacy,9 and
interests in safety, freedom and privacy are strongly reflected in the
psychology of home.10 The existence of this cultural consensus, however,
does not mean that interests in safety, freedom and privacy always trump
competing interests. This Part explores the role of these interests – and
their limits – in criminal law, tort law, criminal procedure and privacy law.
A. Security Against Other Individuals
By their physical nature, homes provide their inhabitants with a measure
of security against attack or invasion by other individuals. But more
important to personal security than locks or alarms is the additional
protection given to homes by the law. As Charlotte Perkins Gilman
observed, “Our safety is really insured by social law and order, not by any
system of home defence. Against the real dangers of modern life, the
[physical] home is no safeguard.”11
The legal protection given to the security of homes can be divided into
two major categories. First, the law privileges certain acts of self-help
made in defense of the home that would in another context be criminal or
tortious. Second, the law imposes criminal sanctions upon individuals who
invade a home, and these sanctions are significantly greater than those
imposed for invasions of other types of property.
The legal doctrine that a man’s home is his castle has its common law
origins in cases dating back to at least 1505 involving the right to defend a
home against invasion by other private individuals.12 In Semayne’s Case,
decided in 1604, the Court held that:
[T]he house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his
defence against injury and violence, as for his repose; and although the life of a
9

See infra notes 50 - 61and accompanying text.
The physical structure of a home provides shelter and physical safety. Smith, supra note 7, at 33-34; Karin
Zingmark & Astrid Norberg, The Experience of Being at Home Throughout the Life Span; Investigation of
Persons Aged From 2 to 102, 41 INT’L J. AGING & HUM. DEV. 47, 50 (1995). The physical space of the home
also is a source of privacy, and of related feelings of comfort and freedom. Smith, supra note 7, at 32 (“[The]
feeling of control within the home is salient for most people, and is linked to the to the satisfaction of basic
psychological needs.”); Zingmark & Norberg, supra, at 50. An empirical study of American attitudes towards
privacy reported that invasions of homes generally, and bedrooms in particular, were widely perceived as very
significant invasions of privacy. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized By
Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738-39 (1993).
11
CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE HOME, ITS WORK AND INFLUENCE 32 (1903).
12
William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602-1791, xciv (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School). Similar doctrines recognizing the special status of
the home existed in a number of ancient legal traditions. See id. at xcii-xciv; NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14-15 (1937). For
example, the Code of Hammurabi permitted the killing of housebreakers, as did Anglo-Saxon and Norman law.
See Lasson, supra, at 14-19.
10
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man is a thing precious and favoured in law; . . . if thieves come to a man’s house
to rob him, or murder, and the owner or his servants kill any of the thieves in
13
defence of himself and his house, it is not felony, and he shall lose nothing.

The privilege of defense of the home continues to the present, and the
castle doctrine has played a significant part in the rule, applicable in many
states, that a person need not retreat when attacked in the home.14 Judge
Cardozo explained the reasons for the exception, using language
highlighting the unique nature of the home, in New York v. Tomlins:
It is not now, and never been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is
bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack.
He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own
home. . . . Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the
15
home.
13

Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604).
See PROSSER ON TORTS § 19 (5th Lawyer’s ed. 1984) (“In [some] states, the ancient rule that there is no
obligation to retreat when the defendant is attacked in his own dwelling house, ‘his castle’ has been continued.
This rule is apparently based on ‘an instinctive feeling that a home is sacred, and that it is improper to require a
man to submit to pursuit from room to room in his own house.’”).
15
New York v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 243 (1914). Another eloquent statement of this rule, made in an
advocacy context, comes from Clarence Darrow’s closing argument in People v. Henry Sweet, where Darrow was
defending a black man against murder charges arising from the defense of his home against a white mob:
14

The first instinct a man has is to save his life. He doesn’t need to experiment. He hasn’t
time to experiment. When he thinks it is time to save his life, he has the right to act. There
isn’t any question about it. It has been the law of every English speaking country so long as
we have had law. Every man’s home is his castle, which even the King may not enter.
Every man has a right to kill to defend himself or his family, or others, either in the defense
of the home or in the defense of themselves.
Closing argument of Clarence Darrow in the case of People v. Henry Sweet, at
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/sweet/darrowsummation.html (last vistited Mar. 2, 2005).
Cardozo’s opinion in Tomlins contains a short survey of authority holding that there is no duty to retreat in
the home. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. at 243-44. Although Cardozo held that the rule was the same when the attacker also
is an occupant of the home, id. at 244, the analysis of the duty to retreat can be more complicated in intradomestic disputes because the attacker has the legal right to be in the home. See generally Weiland v. State, 732
So.2d 1044, 1055 nn. 8-9 (Fla. 1999) (providing broad survey of the law in various jurisdictions in the United
States on this issue); Linda A. Sharp, annotation Homicide: Duty to Retreat Where Assailant and Assailed Share
the Same Living Quarters, 67 A.L.R. 5th 637 (1999); Melissa Wheatcroft, Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants—In
New Jersey A Battered Spouse’s Home is Not Her Castle, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 539 (1999); see also State v. Gartland,
694 A.2d 564, 569-71 (N.J. 1997); Beth Bjerregaard & Anita N. Blowers, Chartering a New Frontier for SelfDefense Claims: The Applicability of the Battered Person Syndrome as a Defense for Parricide Offenders, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 843, 870-71 (1995). The duty to retreat has been particularly controversial in cases
involving victims of domestic violence who kill their batterers. The majority of jurisdictions have held that there
is no duty to retreat in the home in these cases, in part because a person in her own home has no further place to
which to flee. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1997); Commonwealth v. Derby, 678
A.2d 784, 784-87 (Pa. Super. 1996); People v. Emmick, 525 N.Y.S.2d 77, 78 (4th Dep’t 1988); People v.
Lenkevich, 229 N.W.2d 298 (Mich. 1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A). The contrary view is that a
person should have to retreat in the home in cases of attack by a cohabitant if retreat can be accomplished safely.
See, e.g., Thomas, 673 N.E.2d at 1347 (Pfeiffer & Cook, J.J., dissenting); State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 571
(N.J. 1997); State v. Quarles, 504 A.2d 473, 476 (R.I. 1986); State v. Pontery, 117 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1955); see
also Wheatcroft, supra, at 551 & n.52 (discussing jurisdictions following the minority view). In domestic abuse
cases, however, the history of violence makes it at best doubtful that safe retreat is possible. See Thomas, 673
N.E.2d at 1343; Maryanne E. Kampmann, The Legal Victimization of Battered Women, 15 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 101, 112-13 (1993); see also Gartland, 694 A.2d at 571 (criticizing statute that required a holding of duty to
retreat inside the home, and arguing that statute should be changed in part because retreat is unrealistic and unfair
in cases involving history of abuse). That said, the statement made by the Thomas majority that “There is no
rational reason to make . . . a distinction . . . between cases in which the assailant has a right equal to the
defendant’s to inhabit the residents and cases in which the assailant is an intruder,” 673 N.E.2d at 1343, goes too
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The importance of homes to personal security also is reflected in the
penalties imposed in criminal law as punishment for invasion of a home,
which generally exceed the penalties imposed for invasions of other types
of property. The additional protection given homes in criminal law has a
long history in the common law – indeed, at common law, the crime of
burglary was concerned exclusively with invasions of homes16 – and is
widely reflected in contemporary criminal statutes.17
B. Security Against the Government and the Fourth Amendment
The castle doctrine is a frequent feature in contemporary cases involving
governmental searches of a home. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, to note
that at the time of the origins of the castle doctrine, the home was expressly
held not to be impervious to invasions by the government, which was
viewed as having virtually “absolute powers of search, arrest, and
confiscation.”18 In Semayne’s Case, discussed above,19 the court began by
stating the castle doctrine privileging the killing of thieves invading a home,
but then immediately went on to state that “In all cases where the King is
party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the house, either to
arrest or do other execution of the King’s process.”20
Gradually, however, the castle doctrine began to be used as a rhetorical
tool by those resisting government invasions of the home. In 1663, three
Rhode Islanders informed a constable attempting to serve a warrant “that
‘they . . . were Resoulffed to knock Down any man that should pry in upon

far. There is an obvious reason to make such a distinction – the cohabitant has an equal right to be in the home.
A more accurate statement would have been that there are reasons to make that distinction, but, particularly in
cases involving a history of abuse, these reasons do not outweigh the victim’s right to defend against an attacker
without retreat in the home.
16
See CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 325 at 251 (15th ed. 1995) (noting that only
invasions of homes were the subject of common-law burglary); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 21.1(c) at
1022 (4th ed. 2003) (same); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Rediscovering The Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 642 n.259 (1999) ( “The common-law felony of burglary also demonstrated the unique status
of the house. As a general rule, attempt offenses (conduct committed "with intent" to inflict a harm) were only
misdemeanors at common law; however, breaking into a house at night with intent to commit a felony was a
felony.”). Similar protection of the home was reflected in Anglo-Saxon law, which “recognized the crime of
hamsocn (or hamfare), an offense the whole gist of which was solely the forcible entry into a man’s dwelling, a
‘domus invasion.’ Throughout the laws of Anglo-Saxon and Norman times this offense was looked upon with
great severity, justifying the killing of the perpetrator in the act without the payment of compensation usual in
those days.” LASSON, supra note 12
, at 18 -19. Similarly, the common-law crime of arson focused on homes, as
opposed to other types of structures. See TORCIA, supra, § 339 at 333; LAFAVE, supra, § 21.3(c).
17
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 22.1(2) (providing that invasion of a home is subject to higher level of
punishment than other types of burglary); CAL. PENAL CODE § 460 (West 1999) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
140.20, 140.25 (McKinney 2004) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-311, 16-11-312, 16- 11- 313 (same); LAFAVE,
supra note 16
, § 21.1(g) at 1026 (noting that the fact that a home is involved is a common aggravating factor in
modern burglary statutes).
18
Cuddihy, supra note 12
, at xcix (discussing Semayne’s Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.
1604)).
19
See supra note 13and accompanying text.
20
Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604).
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them for their howse was ther Castle.’”21 By the Revolutionary War era a
century later, the castle doctrine was often used in rhetoric against abuses of
government power.22 Two prominent and influential examples of this usage
stand out. According to John Adams’ notes of James Otis’ argument in the
1761 Writs of Assistance Case, Otis argued that the writ at issue was
“against the fundamental Principles of Law” because “A Man, who is quiet,
is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle, not with standing all his
Debts, and civil Process of any kind.”23 Two years later, in a speech to
Parliament, William Pitt used the castle doctrine to make a powerful
rhetorical statement for the primacy of even the most humble individual at
home against the power of the King:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter – all his force
24
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!

As a result of this type of rhetoric, the castle doctrine radically changed
meaning over the course of less than two centuries, as “‘A man’s house is
his castle (except against the government)’ yielded to ‘A man’s house is his
castle (especially against the government).’”25
In this new form, the castle doctrine was an important intellectual
foundation of the Fourth Amendment,26 and more generally the sanctity and
21

Cuddihy, supra note 12
, at xcvii (quoting Rhode Island court record dated May 16, 1663).
Id. at xcvii; see also Davies, supra note 16, at 642-50 (1999); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING
AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION, 234-35 (1988).
23
2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 125-26 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). As Leonard
Levy has noted,
22

Any fastidious legal historian must acknowledge that Otis’s argument compounded
mistakes and misinterpretations. In effect, he reconstructed the fragmentary evidence
buttressing the rhetorical tradition against general searches, and he advocated that any
warrant other than a specific one violated the British constitution. That Otis distorted
history is pedantic; he was making history.
LEVY, supra note 22
, at 227.

Adams himself used the castle doctrine in arguments he made as a legal advocate:

An Englishmans dwelling House is his Castle. The Law has erected a Fortification round
it–and as every Man is Party to the Law, i.e. the Law is a Covenant of every Member of
society with every other Member, therefore every Member of Society has entered into a
solemn Covenant with every other that he shall enjoy in his own dwelling House as
compleat a security, safety and Peace and Tranquility as if it was surrounded with Walls of
Brass, with Ramparts and Palisadoes and defended with a Garrison and Artillery....
Every English[man] values himself exceedingly, he takes a Pride and he glories justly in
that strong Protection, that sweet Security, that delightfull Tranquillity which the Laws have
thus secured to him in his own House, especially in the Night. Now to deprive a Man of
this Protection, this quiet and Security in the dead of Night, when himself and Family
confiding in it are asleep, is treat[ing] him not like an Englishman not like a Freeman but
like a Slave....
1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS at 137 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (quoting Adams’s notes
of his argument in the 1774 case King v. Stewart).
24
William Pitt, SPEECH ON THE EXCISE BILL (1763).
25
Cuddihy, supra note 12
, at c (emphasis original).
26
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Davies, supra note 16,at 642 -50; Levy, supra note
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special nature of the home were issues of critical importance to the
founders. As Thomas Y. Davies has written, the “historical record . . .
reveals that the Framers focused their concerns and complaints [about
government searches and seizures] rather precisely on searches of houses
under general warrants,”27 and reference to the importance of home was
common in Revolutionary-era rhetoric attacking excessive government
searches.28 The unique nature and importance of homes is reinforced by the
fact that Revolutionary-era critics tended not to object as strongly when
other types of property – such as warehouses and ships – were subject to
oppressive searches by British authorities.29 Homes were also treated
differently than other types of property in colonial-era search and seizure
statutes30 and in early federal statutes.31 Express protection of homes was
22, at 222; Cuddihy, supra note 12
, at xc-c; see also Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?:
Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175 (2002) (discussing relationship of castle doctrine to Fourth Amendment);
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 365 (1868) (stating that the common law maxim that “every
man’s house is his castle,” which “secures to the citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the
government,” has been incorporated into the Fourth Amendment).
27
Davies, supra note 16
, at 601.
28
Id. at 601-03. Press accounts of the Wilkesite trials in England, which squarely presented the issue of
government power to search a home, were widely disseminated in the Colonies, and often featured references to
the sanctity of the home. See id. at 564, 602. James Otis’ arguments against the general warrant, quoted above,
focus on the home, see supra note 23 and accompanying text, as did a report of a Boston town meeting usually
attributed to Samuel Adams, see Davies, supra note 16,at 603 n.139 :
[O]ur homes and even our bedchambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes, chests &
trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man would
venture to employ even as menial servants; whenever they are pleased to say they suspect
there are in the house wares etc. for which the dutys have not been paid. Flagrant instances
of wanton exercise of this power, have frequently happened in this and other sea port
Towns. By this we are cut off from that domestick security which renders the lives of the
most unhappy in some measure agreeable. Those Officers may under colour of law and the
cloak of a general warrant, break thro’ the sacred rights of the Domicil, ransack mens
houses, destroy their securities, carry off their property, and with little danger to themselves
commit the most horred murders.
TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1763-1776,243- 44 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967).
Adams’ reference to “wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants” is
an example of a class issue that contributed to the outrage over general warrants. As Davies explains:
[T]he Framers’ perception of the untrustworthiness of the ordinary officer was reinforced
by class-consciousness and status concerns. It was disagreeable enough for an elite or
middle-class householder to have to open his house to a search in response to a command
from a high status magistrate acting under a judicial commission; it was a gross insult to the
householder’s status as a ‘free man’ to be bossed about by an ordinary officer who was
likely drawn from an inferior class. For example, during the 1761 Writs of Assistance
Case, James Otis complained that the delegation of authority to a petty officer by a general
writ of assistance reduced a householder to being “the servant of servants.”
Davies, supra note 16
, at 577 -78.
29
See id. at 602-08. For example, in one newspaper article, James Otis repeatedly complained of violations
of homes but “did not complain of searches of ships, shops, or warehouses.” Id. at 602 n.136. Ships were
generally understood to be treated differently than other types of property because they fell under admiralty law,
and therefore were understood by the framers not to fall under the purview of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
605-08. Contemporary misunderstanding of the Colonial-era legal status of ships has contributed to an
unwarranted erosion of the protection given homes in civil forfeiture cases. See id. at 607 & n.156.
30
See Davies, supra note 16
, at 681 -82.
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provided in many of the colonial precursors to the Fourth Amendment.32
Consistent with this historical record, search and seizure law continues
to emphasize the unique nature of homes and to give homes additional
protection as compared to other types of property.33 Prohibition-era cases
gave special treatment to homes.34 Contemporary Fourth Amendment cases
contain frequent references to the castle doctrine35 and the sanctity of
home.36 The Supreme Court has held that a search of a home generally
speaking can only be made with a warrant,37 stating that “the Fourth
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house,”38 and making
“clear that any physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a
fraction of an inch,’ was too much.”39 Searches of other types of property,
such as cars and open land, often may be made without warrants.40
31

See id. at 713-14.
See id. at 595-97.
33
The additional protection given to homes is also supported by the empirical evidence on American social
values. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 10, at 738 -39 (collecting empirical evidence that searches of
homes, and particularly bedrooms, are considered highly invasive in American society).
34
As Jonathan L. Hafetz has explained,
32

Federal Prohibition law treated the home with particular deference. The Volstead Act,
which implemented Prohibition, not only barred issuance of a warrant to search ‘any private
dwelling occupied as such unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating
liquor,’ but also provided for criminal sanctions against any officer who conducted such an
unlawful search. Many cases invalidating liquor seizures involved ‘private dwellings,’
defined by statute to include rooms ‘occupied not transiently but solely as a residence.’
Even when courts initially upheld Prohibition searches and seizures against legal
challenges, they reaffirmed the sanctity of the home and distinguished searches for illegal
liquors in private homes, from those in open fields and automobiles. The majority of state
courts that adopted a rule excluding unconstitutionally seized evidence – a rule required
under the Constitution only in federal cases at the time – did so in Prohibition cases
involving searches of private homes (or businesses).
Hafetz, supra note 26
, at 200 -01.
35
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931(1995).
36
See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (“The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuriesold principle of respect for the privacy of the home.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (an “overriding
respect for the sanctity of the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (“[T]he sanctity of private dwellings [is] often
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.”); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable government searches.”).
37
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“With few exceptions, the question whether a
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“[A] basic principle of Fourth Amendment law [is that] searches and seizures inside a
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” (quotation omitted)); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed....”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (holding that searches
of homes require warrants).
38
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 590).
39
Id., at 37 (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).
40
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-72
(1991); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1997); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-809 (1982). Drawing a line between homes and vehicles can be challenging in cases
involving hybrids such as motor homes and houseboats. Courts faced with this challenge have used a functional
test to decide whether the hybrid qualifies as a home or vehicle. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 &
n.3 (1985) (categorizing motor home as a vehicle but leaving open possibility of a different result if motor home
was “situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a residence”; relevant factors
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Similarly, a warrant is required for arrests made in the home,41 but not for
arrests made on the street or in other locations.42
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that a thermal imaging scan of
a home was an illegal search, rejecting the government’s argument that the
scan did not reveal “intimate details” and noting that “In the home, our
cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held
safe from prying government eyes.”43 In contrast, an aerial photograph of
an industrial complex was not an unconstitutional search, because the
photograph “did not reveal any ‘intimate details’” and because the industrial
complex did not “share the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home.”44
Placing a tracing device on a container of chemicals was held in one case
not to be a search requiring a warrant,45 but monitoring a similar device
within a home was a search and required a warrant.46
C. Privacy
The importance of home in creating a zone where the individual is
paramount over the community is a dominant theme in privacy law. The
relationship between home and privacy makes a great deal of intuitive sense
– homes are the primary source of what colloquially is known as personal
space and are the location of bedrooms, along with everything that
“bedroom” has become code for in cultural and legal discourse.
include “location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the
vehicle is licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road.”);
United States v. Albers, 136 F.3d 670, 673 & n.3 (1997) (Kozinski, J.) (applying Carney test and categorizing a
houseboat as a vehicle, but noting that “in many situations it will be objectively apparent that a houseboat is being
used as home and not a vehicle. [For example, a] houseboat not independently mobile or one that is permanently
moored would present a different case.”); United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1988) (categorizing a
houseboat as a vehicle under Carney test).
It may be tempting to advocates, courts and commentators to argue for the extension of the level of
protection given to homes to other contexts in search and seizure law. Broadening the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection may generally be intended to increase the protection given to individual liberty in the
search-and-seizure arena, but may have an unintended contrary effect by devaluing the idea that homes are unique
and deserve a special level of protection. See Davies, supra note 16, at 739 & n.551 (arguing that broadening the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection in other contexts has had the effect of undermining the Fourth
Amendment protection of the home.). Express analogies of the home to another context can be particularly
damaging in this regard. For example, in one case the Supreme Court expressly analogized commercial property
to a home in a search and seizure case. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (a “businessman, like
the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official
entries upon his private commercial property.” (emphasis added)). The Court’s analogy was intended to bolster
its extension of Fourth Amendment protection to the business context, but it cheapened the unique status of the
home by suggesting that it is comparable to commercial property. Arguments about Fourth Amendment issues in
other contexts that ignore the unique nature of homes risk devaluing the sanctity of the home that is at the core of
the Fourth Amendment.
41
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
42
See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001);
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (no warrant requirement for arrest made on street);
43
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
44
Id. (distinguishing Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986)).
45
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1983).
46
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984).
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Unsurprisingly, privacy cases often feature strong rhetoric regarding the
importance of the home.47 For example, in one case, Justice Black called
the home “the sacred retreat to which families repair for their privacy and
their daily way of living,”48 and in another case the Court held that “The
State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the
home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.”49
This Subpart begins by exploring the simultaneous evolution of the
modern conceptions of home and privacy, underscoring the interrelationship
of these ideas in Western culture. It then illustrates the profound
importance of home to the legal concept of privacy through two lines of
cases where otherwise strong social interests are trumped by the privacy
interest in the home. The first line of cases involves the right to engage in
conduct in the home that would be illegal in another context. The second
line involves the primacy of privacy in the home over otherwise stronglyprotected First Amendment free speech rights.
1. The Evolution of Home and Privacy
The modern home owes its physical form to the emergence of the
bourgeois class in the Middle Ages. As Witold Rybczynski explained,
“unlike the aristocrat, who lived in a fortified castle, or the cleric, who lived
in a monastery, or the serf, who lived in a hovel, the bourgeois lived in a
house.”50
The early bourgeois house, however, was very different from a modern
home. Rooms did not have specialized functions, and the same space
served as working, eating and sleeping quarters throughout the day.51 In the
absence of public meeting spaces like restaurants, bars and hotels, the house
served as a place to entertain and to transact business.52 The household
itself typically went far beyond the immediate family, and often included
apprentices, servants and friends.53 With large households living in one or
two rooms, and often sleeping in the same bed, privacy within the
household did not exist.54
47
As with search and seizure law, see supra note 40, courts and commentators have used the rhetoric of
home to advocate for the extension of the privacy protection given to homes to other contexts. For example,
Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman used powerful references to the explicit protections of the home
in the Third and Fourth Amendments, and to the widely acknowledged privacy interest in the home, to advocate
for broader protection of family life outside of the strict context of the home. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
549 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although it may be an effective advocacy tool for increased privacy
protection in other contexts, the use of home in this way runs the risk of eroding the privacy protection afforded to
homes by devaluing the uniqueness of home as a zone where the individual’s right of privacy is paramount.
48
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
49
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
50
WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 25 (1986).
51
Id. at 18.
52
Id. at 27.
53
Id. at 27.
54
Id. at 24, 27-28; see also PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
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The medieval home did not contain a family unit that we would
recognize, and, as discussed further below in the context of family law, the
modern conception of family did not emerge until children of the bourgeois
began to live at home during their school years.55 At the same time as the
modern family unit began to develop, the home became a less public space
housing fewer people as many bourgeois began to work outside the home.56
This shift, combined with the presence of children, resulted in a profound
change in the nature of the home, which “was now a place for personal,
intimate behavior [and] the setting for a new, compact social unit: the
family.”57 A parallel increase in the number of rooms in the home created
private spaces for people to act as individuals within the family unit. This
increase in the number of bedrooms “indicated not only new sleeping
arrangements, but a novel distinction between the family and the
individual.”58 By the Eighteenth Century, the desire for privacy became a
significant component of Western culture.59
Thus, modern conceptions of home, family and privacy evolved
together. As historian John Lukacs explained, “Domesticity, privacy,
comfort, the concept of the home and of the family: these are, literally,
principal achievements of the Bourgeois Age.”60 Parents and children
living together in one dwelling became the core of both our conception of
home and our conception of family. The evolution of home in a sense
separated the family and its private life from the larger community.
Similarly, the evolution of privacy within the home, and of separate
bedrooms for the home’s inhabitants, was instrumental in the development
of a sense of individuality – as home separated family from community,
bedrooms and growing notions of individual privacy allowed individuals to
develop separately from both family and the larger community.61
FAMILY, 411 (Robert Baldick trans.1962) (describing lack of privacy in the medieval household). A lack of
privacy and intimacy does not mean, of course, that people were not physically intimate. As Rybczynski notes,
“Medieval paintings frequently show a couple in bed or bath, and nearby in the same room friends or servants in
untroubled, and apparently unembarrassed, conversation.” RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50, at 27-28. This lack of
privacy is obviously different from contemporary norms, though it is important to note that legal issues relating to
privacy typically concern privacy in relation to the government or strangers, as opposed to other members of the
household. This distinction notwithstanding, Rybczynski’s description of bathing medieval couples makes an
interesting comparison to one recent case involving police use of thermal-imaging equipment, in which Justice
Scalia primly observed that the equipment might reveal “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her
daily sauna and bath – a detail that many would consider ‘intimate.’” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38
(2001); see supra note 43and accompanying text (discussing Kyllo).
55
RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50
, at 48 -49; see infra notes 124 - 128 and accompanying text (discussing
evolution of the modern concept of family in the context of family law issues involving the home).
56
RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50
, at 39, 77.
57
Id. at 77.
58
Id. at 110.
59
Id. at 86-87; FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE: CIVILIZATION AND
CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH CENTURY, at 308 (Miriam Kochan, trans., revised by Sian Reynolds (1981)).
60
John Lukacs, The Bourgeois Interior, 39 AM. SCHOLAR, 616 (1970).
61
RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50
, at 1 11 (“The desire for a room of one’s own was not simply a matter of
personal privacy. It demonstrated the growing awareness of individuality – of a growing personal inner life – and
the need to express this individuality in physical ways.”).
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2. Privacy and Prohibited Conduct in the Home

In Stanley v. Georgia,62 the Supreme Court held that an individual could
not be prosecuted for possession of obscene materials in the home. In
reaching this holding, the Court recognized the States’ “broad power to
regulate obscenity,” but “that power simply does not extend to mere
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.”63 In other
words, the Court held that conduct that could otherwise be prohibited by the
States – possession of obscene materials – could not be prohibited in the
home.64
Other courts following Stanley’s lead have held that certain conduct that
could be prohibited in other contexts cannot be prohibited in the home. For
example, the Alaska Supreme Court looked to Stanley in holding that the
State could not prohibit possession of marijuana in the home, basing its
holding in part on the reasoning that “If there is any area of human activity
to which a right to privacy pertains more than any other, it is the home.”65
Similar use of Stanley and the castle doctrine was made by a dissenting
judge arguing that the government could not prohibit the possession of
handguns in the home, while recognizing the government’s power to
regulate handgun possession in other contexts.66
The result in Stanley – that the government cannot prohibit conduct in
the home that in another context would be subject to criminal sanction – is
remarkable, both in the positive sense that it highlights the unique nature of
the home as a source of privacy and in the negative sense that it represents
an extreme boundary of the castle doctrine. The Stanley Court recognized
that privacy in the home must have limits, noting that an individual’s
privacy interest could be trumped by a compelling government interest.67
As an example, it cited a statute prohibiting possession of defense
information harmful to national security,68 and the Court subsequently held
that the government’s interest in preventing child pornography is
sufficiently compelling to justify the criminalization of possession of child

62

394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 568; see also id. at 565 (“Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity,
we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means
that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he
may watch.”).
64
See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991-92 (1982) (discussing
importance of concept of home, and its relation to privacy, autonomy and personhood, to the Court’s analysis in
Stanley).
65
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (1975).
66
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (1982) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (“There is no area of
human activity more protected by the right to privacy than the right to be free from unnecessary government
intrusion in the confines of the home.”).
67
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11.
68
Id.
63
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pornography in the home.69
Contemporary courts also recognize that the importance of privacy and
autonomy in the home does not mean that a person should be able to engage
in conduct within the home that is harmful to others.70 This represents a
welcome change from the willingness of some courts in the past to use the
idea of home as a private sphere as an excuse to turn a blind eye to domestic
abuse.71 Some critics argue that the ideology of privacy in the home
continues to be used to shelter abuse,72 and the recognition that privacy can
have a dark side is critical to striking the correct balance between competing
interests.73 This recognition, however, amounts to a persuasive argument
that the private sphere of home should have limits, not a persuasive
argument against the private sphere of the home generally. So limited, the
role of the home as a unique place of privacy and autonomy remains
deserving of strong legal protection.
3. Privacy in the Home as a Limit on Free Speech
The unique nature of the home also is reflected in a line of cases holding
that the interest of privacy in the home trumps free speech rights that
typically are strongly protected by the courts.
Restrictions on
demonstrations aimed at a particular residence and on broadcast of political
speech using sound trucks were upheld on the basis of protecting privacy in
the home, as was a regulation allowing people to force a vendor to take their
69

Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990).
See, e.g., Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (emphasizing the harm that child pornography inflicts on children in
context of upholding law criminalizing possession of child pornography); Ravin, 537 P.2d at 494 (“No one has an
absolute right to do things in the privacy of his own home which will affect himself or others adversely.”).
71
American courts in the Nineteenth Century declined to punish husbands for spousal abuse, viewing the
home as a private sphere beyond the scope of public concern. See Hafetz, supra note 26,at 187 -89; see also Reva
B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beatings as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150-74 (1996)
(discussing Nineteenth-Century courts’ use of privacy as a justification for decriminalizing spousal abuse).
72
See, e.g., Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property and
Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 366 (1993); c.f. Jeanne Moore, Placing Home in Context, 20 J. Envoron.
Psych. 207, 212 (2000) (In the study of the psychology of home, “there has been an increasing focus on the
negative and darker side of home experience. Home can be a prison and a place of terror as well as a haven or
place of love.”).
73
As Elizabeth Schneider noted in discussing the feminist critique of privacy, privacy can be both positive
and negative:
70

Privacy has seemed to rest on a division of public and private that has been oppressive to
women and has supported male dominance in the family. Privacy reinforces the idea that
the personal is separate from the political; privacy also implies something that should be
kept secret. The right of privacy has been viewed as a passive right, one which says that the
state cannot intervene. However, . . . Privacy is important to women in many ways. It
provides an opportunity for individual self-development, for individual decisionmaking and
for protection against endless caretaking. In addition, there are other related aspects of
privacy, such as the notion of autonomy, equality, liberty, and freedom of bodily integrity,
that are central to women’s independence and well-being.
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 979 (1991). Where to draw the line
between private and public depends on the competing interests involved in each particular case.
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name off a mailing list.74 In a related case, speech made from the home was
given additional protection from municipal time, place and manner
regulation.75 Taken together, these cases reinforce the unique status of the
home as essential to the liberty of the individual, both as a refuge from
unwanted speech from other members of the community and as a venue for
political speech that in form or content is objectionable to the rest of the
community.
D. A Castle, But Not an Impregnable One
The idea of home as castle is a powerful metaphor and is a major
component of the ideology of the home. But the metaphor has its limits,
and the castle’s walls can be breached by a sufficiently strong competing
interest. Despite the strong protection given to the home in the search-andseizure context, the government can still enter and search a home if it can
obtain a warrant. Similarly, despite the remarkable treatment of home in
privacy law, where the privacy interest of the home trumps interests that are
in other contexts treated as paramount by the law, a person should not be
able to use the zone of privacy and autonomy created by the home to engage
in conduct harmful to others. Homes are unique when interests of safety,
freedom and privacy are at stake, and deserve special legal treatment in
these contexts. But the ideological view of home as castle only goes so far,
and should not be dispositive on any legal issue.
II. HOME, SELF AND POSSESSION
The law generally protects a property owner’s possession of property,
but recognizes that the right to possession may be overcome by a competing
74
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (residential demonstrations); Rowan v. United States Post Office,
397 U.S. 728 (1970) (mailing list); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound trucks); see also Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (noting importance of residential privacy, but striking down residential
picketing ordinance because of availability of less restrictive means); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (same); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (discussing importance of
privacy in the home in the context of political speech). For a discussion of these cases and the interrelationship
between the home and First Amendment issues, see Mark Cordes, Property and the First Amendment, 31 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1, 42-49 (1997).
75
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994). In Ladue, the Court held that:

A special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and
our law; that principle has special resonance when the government seeks to constrain a
person’s ability to speak there. Most Americans would be understandably dismayed, given
that tradition, to learn that it was illegal to display from their window an 8-by-11 sign
expressing their political views. Whereas the government’s need to mediate among various
competing uses, including expressive ones, for public streets and facilities is constant and
unavoidable, its need to regulate temperate speech from the home is surely much less
pressing.
Id. Consistent with the holding in Ladue, the psychology of home reveals that the privacy and freedom created by
the home allows for feelings of self-expression and self-actualization. Smith, supra note 7, at 32.
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interest. For example, a creditor in many circumstances can overcome an
owner’s right of possession to satisfy an unpaid debt, and the government
can take possession of property when required for a public purpose by
eminent domain so long as just compensation is paid to the owner.
In a number of areas of law, the right to possess a home is given more
protection the right to possess other types of property. Homestead
exemptions, rights of redemption in foreclosure, just cause eviction statutes,
and residential rent control are just some of the instances where debtorcreditor laws and landlord-tenant laws give more protection to the
possessory interest in the home than the law ordinarily gives to the
possession of other types of property .76
The additional protection given to possession of homes makes intuitive
sense – no one could imagine being happy about being forced to leave their
home. The literature on the psychology of home reinforces this intuitive
view, showing that homes are sources of feelings of rootedness, continuity,
stability, permanence, and connection to larger social networks.77 As a
result, dislocation from a home can have a strong negative psychological
impact on many people.78 Recognition of the importance of an individual’s
tie to a home, however, does not mean that the possessory interest in the
home should be favored by the law in all cases where it is balanced against
a competing interest that ordinarily is given substantial weight.
This Part examines the legal system’s balance between the possessory
interest in the home and competing legal interests.79 As a starting point, this
Part assesses the relative strength of the possessory interest in the home in
light of Margaret Jane Radin’s analysis of this issue in her groundbreaking
article Property and Personhood.80 Comparing Radin’s analysis to the
literature on the psychology of home suggests that the possessory interest in
the home, while substantial, may not be as strong as Radin asserts. This
Part then examines a series of legal issues where the possessory interest in
the home is balanced against a competing interest, dividing these issues into
three subgroups: areas where the law strikes an appropriate balance, areas
where the law overprotects the possession of a home, and areas where the
law underprotects possession of a home.
76

See infra notes 98 - 123 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84 - 89and accompanying text.
See infra notes 90 - 94and accompanying text.
79
In many circumstances, this issue will become a choice between favoring the competing interest or forcing
a person to move to another home in another location. In other circumstances, the choice may not be between two
homes, one perhaps more desirable than the other, but rather be between a home and homelessness. The
discussion here is not focused on a person’s interest in (or perhaps right to) shelter. Rather, it is focused on the
right to possess a particular home in a particular location. Even if one accepts a right to shelter, it does not
necessarily include the right to shelter in a particular place. Possession and shelter concern different things –
shelter is concerned with the human need for a home generally, while possession is concerned with a person’s
connection to one particular home.
80
Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64.
77
78
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A. Evaluating the Personal Interest In the Home

In Property and Personhood and subsequent works, Radin developed a
“personhood” theory of property.81 Radin’s theory was based nominally on
Hegel’s theory of the person, but the core of her analysis was the pragmatic
observation that people become personally attached to certain types of
property. Radin accordingly divided property into two categories –
personal and fungible. Personal property cannot be completely replaced by
market value compensation; fungible property in contrast can be replaced
by market value compensation.82
Radin’s classic example was of a wedding ring. To the jeweler, a
wedding ring is fungible – the jeweler would be equally happy with one
ring, another similar ring, or the monetary value of the ring. Once wedding
rings are exchanged with a spouse, the rings take on personal meaning and
cannot be freely replaced with their monetary value. Other examples
include personal photographs, heirlooms and, most relevant here, homes.83
Radin observed that on an intuitive level, homes are personal, but did
not probe the source of this intuition more deeply. The literature on the
psychology of home provides a more detailed picture of people’s
relationships to their homes. Consistent with Radin’s intuition, home is
associated with a range of feelings related to a long-term tie to a physical
location. The home is the physical center of everyday life, and is a source
of feelings of rootedness and belonging.84 Home is the locus of a person’s
immediate family,85 and can be a source of emotional warmth and personal
comfort.86 For people with long-term tenure in their homes, home is a
source of feelings of continuity, stability and permanence.87 Home is the
center of individual social networks and provides a physical tie to “one’s
workplace, school, and other points in the geographical world.”88 Home
also is associated with personal identity, reflecting both how people see
themselves and how they want other people to see them.89
Many of these last psychological ties to the home are related to a
81

See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64, passim; Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent
Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 365 (1986).
82
Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64,at 959 -60.
83
Id. at 959. Another way of putting the same point is that homes are incompletely commodified; that is,
that the importance of homes cannot be completely described in monetary terms. See MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES 108-112 (1996).
84
Smith, supra note 7, at 32;Zingmark & Norberg, supra note 10, at 50.
85
Smith, supra note 7, at 33. Indeed, lack of connection to family can lead the elderly to view their living
spaces as non-homes. Zingmark & Norberg, supra note 10, at 52. On the other hand, negative associations with
family can be tied to negative associations with the home, and issues of intra-family abuse can be a counterweight to the value placed on the privacy provided by the home. See supra notes 71 - 73and accompanying text.
86
Smith, supra note 7, at 33.
87
Id. at 32.
88
Id. at 33.
89
Id. at 32; Roberta M. Feldman, Settlement-Identity: Psychological Bonds with Home Places in a Mobile
Society, 22 ENVIRONMENT & BEHAVIOR 183, 186 (1990).
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particular home in a particular place, and in turn are related to legal issues
that involve the possession of a home. A dislocation from the home
(voluntary or involuntary) involves the loss or alteration of these
psychological ties, and dislocation can have a negative psychological
impact on an individual.90 Not all people relate to their homes in the same
way, however, and dislocation can affect people in different ways.91
Additionally, many important psychological attachments to the home can
move with an individual to a new home. For example, when a person
moves, the zone of privacy, freedom and autonomy also moves. If the
home is owned, senses of value and ownership (both components of the
psychology of home)92 also move. The role of the home as the center of
family life also can move to a new home, and feelings of personal
connectedness can move as an individual personalizes a new home and
moves personal effects that have strong personal meanings.93 Not all
psychological ties, therefore, are implicated in legal issues related to the
possession of a home.94
A closer examination thus reveals that the intuitive view tends to
overstate an individual’s personal connection to a home in a particular
location, because many of the important personal values associated with a
home are movable. Perhaps most importantly, a person will also be able to
move the personal belongings that are critical to making a new living space
feel like home. Each of these movable values are critical components of
90
See Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home, in Leonard J. Duhl, THE URBAN CONDITION, at 151 (1963);
see also Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Psychiatric Implications of Displacement: Contributions from the
Psychology of Place, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1516 (1996) (“The main proposition presented here is that the sense
of belonging, which is necessary for psychological well-being, depends on strong, well-developed relationships
with nurturing places. A major corollary of this proposition is that disturbance in these essential place
relationships leads to psychological disorder.”).
91
See Fried, supra note 90
; see also Andrew J. Sixsmith and Judith A. Sixsmith, Transitions in Home
Experience in Later Life, J. ARCHITECTURAL & PLANNING RESEARCH 181, 186-187 (Vol. 8 No. 3, Autumn, 1991)
(noting that people who have lived in a home for many years often have strong emotional connections to the
home).
92
See infra note 156.
93
D. Geoffrey Hayward, HOME AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT, 7-8 (1975); see
also Sixsmith & Sixsmith, supra note 91, at 186-87(noting importance of objects inside the home to a person’s
feeling of connectedness to the home). The subjects of Smith’s empirical study often raised the effect of
personalization on psychological connection to the home, and described environments that could not be
personalized (e.g., barracks, nurses’ quarters and migrant hotels) as non-homelike. Smith, supra note 7, at 36-41.
Rybczyncki notes that Jane Austen’s description of her heroine’s room in Mansfield Park evokes the importance
of personal property to the sense of being at home:

Fanny Price . . . had a room where she could go “after anything unpleasant below, and find
immediate consolation in some pursuit, or some train of thought at hand. Her plants, her
books – of which she had been a collector from the first hour of her commanding a shilling
– her writing desk, and her works of charity and ingenuity, were all within her reach; or if
indisposed for employment, if nothing but musing would do, she could scarcely see an
object in that room which had not an interesting remembrance connected with it.”
RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50
, at 111.
94
Conversely, the mobility of many of the psychologically important aspects of the home reinforces the
importance of home even in a society where 20% of Americans move each year. See Feldman, supra note 89, at
185-87.
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people’s psychological ties to their homes, and would therefore be
significant components of the intuitive notion that homes are special.95
All of this said, there is something to the intuition that there is a
personal connection to home – the pang of regret, or funny feeling in the
stomach, felt when moving from one home to another. Many of the
important psychological ties to the home – such as feelings of rootedness,
permanence and belonging in the community – are not movable. As a
result, many people suffer significant negative psychological impacts from
moving. This feeling of loss is greater when the move is not voluntary,
because the sense of dislocation is more severe and because the positive
factors that lead to a voluntary move would be absent. Not only would an
involuntary move dislocate a person from her home, but it would also
dislocate her from her community, school, job or family. The personal
interest in home therefore seems to be something that is both real and
something that the law should be concerned about, even if the personal
interest in the home may be less than a general intuition about the home
might lead us to believe.
Radin did not try to strike a balance between the personal interest in the
home against competing interests. Rather, Radin made a broad moral claim
that the personal interest of a person in possessing a home should trump
competing fungible interests.96 In the landlord-tenant context, Radin
therefore asserted that the personal interests of a tenant should be favored
over the fungible interests of a landlord, and in the debtor-creditor context,
the personal interest of the homeowner should be favored over the fungible
interests of a lender.97
Radin’s broad moral claim for favoring the personal interests in
possession of a home over competing fungible interests is problematic
because it is based on a general intuitive view of people’s personal
connection with their homes, rather than a more nuanced view that
recognizes that many important ties to the home are movable. Radin’s
claim also is problematic in its trivialization of the competing interests as
merely fungible. The analysis in the remainder of this Part, in contrast, tries
to balance the relative strength of the personal interest in possessing a home
– which is real and deserving of legal protection, if not as strong as Radin’s
analysis would suggest – against the competing interests presented by each
type of legal issue.
95
Indeed, the relative strength of the personal connection cannot be too strong, because it is often overcome
by other personal interests. People move voluntarily all the time for innumerable reasons – for example, to take a
new job, to move to a better home or community, because they have children, or because their children grow up
and move out of the house. In an increasingly mobile American society, people move on average once every four
years. See FISCHEL, supra note 157, at 59-60.
96
Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 81,at 365.
97
Id.

DRAFT-8/12/ 2005

HOME AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

21

B. Balancing the Personal Interest In the Home Against Competing
Interests
This Sub-Part examines a series of legal issues where courts (and less
often legislatures) have been forced to balance the right to possess a home
against a competing interest. The first section looks at issues, many from
debtor-creditor law and landlord-tenant law, where courts and legislatures
have generally speaking struck an appropriate balance between the
resident’s personal interest in the home and competing interests. The
second section looks at two areas, homestead exemptions and residential
rent control, where the law has over-protected the personal interest in the
home. Finally, the third section examines the treatment of homes in
eminent domain and equitable distribution law, areas where the personal
interest in homes is underprotected.
1. Striking the Right Balance
In the past century, a number of legal reforms in the creditorhomeowner and landlord-tenant contexts have tempered the harsh impact of
traditional common law rules that often resulted in the displacement of
people from their homes. Many of these reforms have struck an appropriate
balance by protecting the homeowner’s or tenant’s interest in staying in
their home without substantially harming the competing interest of the
creditor or landlord.
Most people who buy a home borrow money from a bank to pay most of
the purchase price. If the borrower-homeowner fails to pay the borrowed
money back, then the lender may enforce the security interest granted by the
mortgage and foreclose on the home. All states recognize the debtor’s right
to purchase the home prior to foreclosure, but many states have redemption
statutes that allow the homeowner to buy the home back from the
foreclosure-sale buyer within a period of time after the foreclosure sale is
completed.98 These rights of redemption limit the creditor’s right to sell the
property of a defaulting homeowner, but the creditor (or subsequent
purchaser) is made whole by the redemption payment made by the
homeowner.
Similar balances are struck in certain areas of landlord-tenant law. Justcause eviction statutes limit the right of a landlord to evict tenants.99
98
See BAXTER DUNAWAY, 2 THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE: FORECLOSURE, WORKOUTS,
PROCEDURES §§ 20:1-20:3 (2004); DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS, 132134 (2004); see also Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest In Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 685-86
(1988).
99
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18-53 (West 2000) (restricting circumstances in which residential tenant can
be evicted); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 534-35 (1984) (discussing common types of just-cause eviction statutes); Kenneth K.
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Tenure-rights provisions force landlords to give successive leases to tenants
under certain circumstances.100 Condominium conversion ordinances often
give tenants a right of first refusal to purchase their apartment when their
rental building is converted into a condominium.101 Many of these types of
statutes include exemptions for landlords who are renting part of their own
home,102 and are intended to limit the landlords’ interests where these
interests are fungible. A commercial landlord should not care who is
renting an apartment so long as the rent is paid and the apartment properly
maintained.103 Similarly, a landlord converting a rental building to a
condominium should not care who is buying the apartment so long as the
purchase price is paid. The restrictions placed on the landlord’s commonlaw rights by these types of statutes are real and substantial, but these
restrictions generally speaking are justified by the tenant’s comparatively
stronger personal interest in remaining in their home.
2. Over-Protecting The Personal Interest In Home
This section discusses two instances where the law overprotects the
personal interest in possessing a home: homestead exemptions in some
states (notably Florida and Texas) that absolutely protect homes from
foreclosure by creditors and residential rent control.

Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 833-35 (1983)
(same); see also Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64,at 994 -95 (discussing balance between interests
of landlord and tenant struck by just cause eviction statutes); Singer, supra note 98,at 682-84 (same).
100
New York City’s Rent Stabilization Law, for example, requires landlords to offer tenants renewal leases.
See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(4) (2004); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 9 § 2523.5 (2004).
Combined with just-cause eviction statutes, tenure rights allow tenants to stay in their apartments so long as they
pay their rent and refrain from engaging in harmful activity. Although tenure rights themselves are
unobjectionable if the renewal is at a market rent, the bulk of the Rent Stabilization Law is intended to regulate
rent. As with other rent control statutes, these other provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law goes too far in
protecting the tenant’s possessory interest in the home. See infra notes 119 - 126 and accompanying text.
101
See, e.g., 765 ILL. CONS. STAT. ANN. 605/30 (West 2001) (giving tenant right of first refusal to purchase
unit converted to condominium); FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 718.612 (West 2001) (same). Condominium conversion
ordinances often also place far more substantial restrictions on the landlord’s right to convert, at times preventing
conversion entirely. See Rabin, supra note 99,at 535 -37; Baar, supra note 99,at 835 -38. For example, Brookline
and Cambridge, Massachusetts enacted condominium conversion ordinances that prevented landlords from ever
converting apartments held by certain classes of tenants to condominiums. See Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 418
N.E.2d 335, 337 (Mass. 1981) (“In essence, what the ordinance does is require that any unit which is a controlled
rental unit on August 10, 1979, remain part of the rental housing stock of the city of Cambridge.”); Singer, supra
note 98
, at 684, n. 250. These more severe condominium conversion ordinances, like the rent control ordinances
with which they often are coupled, go too far in favoring the tenant’s possessory interest in the home. See infra
notes 119 - 126 and accompanying text (discussing over-protection of possession of the home in rent control
context).
102
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000) (exempting “owner-occupied premises with not more
than two rental units” from scope of just-cause eviction statute); see also Radin, Property and Personhood, supra
note 64
, at 993 (noting that the view of tenants as havin g a more personal connection than landlords to rental
apartments “is overgeneralized. Some landlords live in one half of a duplex and rent the other half, or rent the
remodeled basement or attic of their home.”); Singer, supra note 98,at 684.
103
Singer, supra note 98
, at 683 -84.
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a. Homestead Exemptions
The unlimited homestead exemptions allowed by Florida, Texas and a
few other states protect the homeowner’s possessory interest by absolutely
prohibiting the foreclosure of a home by creditors.104 These exemptions are
widely reviled, and it is not controversial to say that they over-protect the
possession of the home at the expense of strong creditor’s interests. The
putative justification for homestead exemptions generally – to allow the
debtor family to continue to have shelter105 – can be accomplished by the
type of exemption common in many states that allows a debtor to protect a
certain amount of money from creditors, which can be then used to
purchase or rent a new home.106 The competing interest of creditors is
substantial. Business creditors are able to protect themselves to a certain
extent from the effects of the unlimited homestead exemption – mortgage
creditors are typically not affected by the exemption, and other business
creditors can protect themselves by, among other things, raising prices for
all residents of a state with an unlimited homestead exemption. In contrast,
tort creditors – e.g., victims of fraud, malpractice or negligence – do not
choose their creditors in advance and therefore are unable to protect
themselves from the unlimited homestead exemption. The result has been a
sorry parade of wrongdoers and potential wrongdoers trooping down to
Florida and Texas to purchase expensive homes protected by the unlimited
homestead exemption,107 though he potential for abuse was reduced
recently by bankruptcy reform legislation passed by Congress.108
b. Residential Rent Control
The attention given to residential rent control by legal academia perhaps
is out of proportion to its real world impact – relatively few municipalities
in the United States have active residential rent control regulations, and the
recent trend has been for rent controls to be abolished or weakened.109 But
104

FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 4; TEXAS CONST. Art. 16, § 50; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-45-3; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-2301; IOWA CODE ANN. § 561.16.
105
See Public Health Trust v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d. 946, 948 (Fla. 1988).
106
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. ART. XX, § 1.5 (“The Legislature shall protect, by law, from forced sale a certain
portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of families.” (emphasis supplied)). Another reasonable
approach to the treatment of debtor’s homes is found in the tax code, where a taxpayer’s residence may only be
seized as a last resort, and only after approval in writing by a U.S. District Court. See 26 U.S.C. § 6334(a)(13)(B)
and (e).
107
See G. Marcus Coles, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227
(2000); Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning Up the Pigsty: Approaching a Consensus on Exemption Laws, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 275 (2000); Richard Lombino, Uniformity of Exemptions: Assessing the Commission’s Proposals, 6
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 177, 198
- 202 (1998).
108
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 prevents debtors in federal
bankruptcy cases from using the unlimited homestead exemptions for homes that have been owned for less than
forty months. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1).
109
For example, Massachusetts abolished rent control in 1994 and California substantially reduced the scope
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rent control does provide a good window into academic thought about how
to balance between the property interests of landlords, tenants and other
members of the community.
Radin is among the most prominent defenders of rent control. The
centerpiece of her argument in favor of rent control is that the personal
interest in the home trumps competing, fungible interests:
[M]y claim is simply that the private home is a justifiable form of personal
property, while a landlord’s interest is often fungible. A tenancy, no less than a
single-family house, is the sort of property interest in which a person becomes
self-invested; and after the self-investment has taken place, retention of the
interest becomes a priority claim over curtailment of merely fungible interests of
110
others.

Radin bolsters her assertion that the tenant’s personal interest should control
over the landlord’s fungible interest by comparing the legal treatment given
to tenants and homeowners. Just as homeowners are given “special
concessions” such as homestead exemptions and rights of redemption in
foreclosure that protect their possessory interest in their homes, “it also
seems right to safeguard the tenant from losing her home even if it means
some curtailment of the landlord’s interest.”111 So, too, it makes sense to
Radin to favor the interests of current tenants over the interests of tenants
who are new to the market, who have not yet become personally connected
to their home.112
As discussed above in the context of just cause eviction statutes,
condominium conversion ordinances and tenure rights, it does make sense
to make “some curtailment” of a landlord’s interest to protect a tenant’s
personal interest in possessing the home.113 The issue is where to strike the
balance between the competing interests. Just as absolute homestead
exemptions go too far in favoring a homeowner’s possessory interest over a
competing interest,114 rent control goes too far in favoring a tenant’s interest
against a host of competing interests that are harmed by rent control.115
The price of the benefit conferred by rent control on long-term tenants is
born by a wide range of other members of the community. New tenants are
harmed by being forced to pay higher rents due to the absence from the

of rent control in 1996. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 40P § 4 (West 2004); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1954.50 et seq. (West
Supp. 2005).
110
Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 81,at 365.
111
Id. at 365-66.
112
See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64,at 994.
113
See supra notes 102 - 106 and accompanying text.
114
See supra notes 107 - 111 and accompanying text.
115
The fact that homeowners are given excessive protection of their possessory interests does not justify
similarly excessive protections being given to tenants. As Richard Epstein noted in refuting the similar argument
that the subsidization of homeowners by the tax code justifies rent control subsidization of tenants, two wrongs
don’t make a right. See Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control Revisited: One Reply to Seven Critics, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 1281, 1294 (1989).
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housing market of the apartments subject to rent control.116 The very poor
are harmed by a decrease in available housing caused by the negative
impact of rent control on the incentive of landlords to maintain or create
housing stock.117 Landlords are harmed by a profound limitation placed on
their property rights by rent control.118 Homeowners in a neighborhood
with rent-controlled apartments are harmed by the negative impact that rent
control has on home values.119 In addition to these negative impacts on
other members of the community, rent control has been widely criticized as
being an ineffective tool for two of its purported policy goals, providing
housing to the poor and redistributing wealth to the poor. Although there
are some dissenting views, the consensus among economists is that rent
control has been ineffective in providing affordable housing to the poor and
has had negative effects on housing markets where rent control is present.120
116

See Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 81,at 365.
See ANTHONY DOWNS, A REEVALUATION OF RENT CONTROLS, 4 (1996); FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 82.
118
Rent control allows a tenant to stay in an apartment at a below-market price, not only restricting the
landlord’s common-law right to rent to someone else at the end of a lease term but restricting the landlord’s right
to make market returns from the property. This is a far more substantial impact on the landlord’s property rights
than simple tenure rights, which allow a tenant to stay in the home so long as they are willing to pay market rent.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text. The result of rent control is to transfer to the tenant a portion of the
economic benefits of ownership. The law has long made a distinction between ownership and tenancy, and this
distinction is not a mere relic of feudal property law. Owners own, with all of the benefits and risks that
ownership presents. Tenants rent, with perhaps fewer benefits and fewer risks. See infra Part III (discussing
disparate treatment of freeholds and leaseholds). Curtis Berger argued that “The salient difference between the
tenant and homeowner lies in the equity buildup (and possible equity loss) that accompanies ownership.” Curtis J.
Berger, Home Is Where The Heart Is: A Brief Reply to Professor Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1240-41
(1989). Berger noted that many first-time homebuyers do not have a substantial equity stake when they first buy
their homes, and argued that in the amount of time that it would take for a homebuyer to develop a substantial
amount of equity both a tenant and homeowner would have an equivalent personal connection to their home. Id.
As a result, Berger argued, ownership should not give homeowners more of a right to stay in their home than
renters. Id. Berger’s argument, however, is based on a flawed premise – there is far more to the difference
between ownership and rental than the amount of equity an owner actually has in a home. Even a homeowner
with minimal equity in a home is fully exposed to the gains and losses that result from fluctuations of the housing
market. Indeed, it is this undiversified exposure to the housing market that makes homeowners such active
citizens in local affairs, providing, among other things, a republican justification for favoring homeowners over
renters. See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 3-6, 10-12; infra notes 158 - 164 and accompanying text (discussing
republican arguments for favoring homeowners); see also Epstein, One Reply to Seven Critics, supra note 115, at
1293-94 (noting that because a tenant does not have a substantial portion of assets tied up in her home, she is
better able to diversify her investments). It is true that long-term tenants and homeowners might have a similar
emotional attachment to a home, see Berger, supra, at 1240-41, but this does not mean that the long-term tenant’s
personal interest in a home is sufficient to justify a radical transfer of the landlord’s property rights to the tenant.
Describing his connection to his own rent-controlled apartment, Berger said that “Knowing that I am secure in
that attachment, and that the landlord’s whim or a stranger’s ‘higher bid’ can not destroy these rooted
associations, is essential to my sense of identity.” Berger, supra, at 1240-41. Perhaps Berger’s personal
connection to his home justifies protecting him from his “landlord’s whim,” but if he wanted to be protected from
a ‘higher bid’ he could have, and should have, purchased, not rented. Like many beneficiaries of rent control,
Berger had the opportunity to buy, but decided not to, not because he couldn’t afford it, but because his subsidized
rent was a better deal than buying. See id. at 1240 n.5.
119
See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 82 (explaining that rent control negatively impacts home values by
reducing the quality of housing stock, which will be reflected in housing prices in neighboring areas, and by
increasing the tax burden on homeowners, which will be capitalized into home values.).
120
See DOWNS, supra note 117, at 2-4 (summarizing economic studies on rent control and concluding that
“All rent controls are unjust to owners of existing rental units, inefficient as anti-poverty policies, and damaging
to some of the very low-income renters they are supposed to protect. Moreover, most of the benefits produced by
rent controls aid moderate-, middle-, and upper-income households, rather than the poor households they may
have been adopted to help.”); but see JOHN I. GOLDERBLOOM & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING RENTAL
117
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Rent control is a poor tool for wealth redistribution because its one class of
economic winners are long-term tenants, who are not necessarily (indeed,
are not typically) poor.
One important aspect of the personal interest in possessing a home is
that it provides a tie to the community.121 A person forced to move may
become separated from family, friends, school and workplace. Radin and
others making a moral case for rent control unsurprisingly include a strong
appeal to community in their arguments. The case for rent control,
however, is an odd communitarian argument in that rent control favors one
discrete class of people – long-term tenants – at the expense of the rest of
the community. Other tenants (both those in non-controlled apartments and
prospective tenants who wish to join the community), the very poor,
landlords and homeowners all suffer because of rent control. The
community as a whole suffers because rent control can stifle the organic
change that makes cities dynamic places. As Richard Epstein observed in
criticizing Radin’s position on rent control:
It is very risky to announce that some persons or some roles count for more than
others. Potential entrants to certain markets are real people whose goals,
aspirations, and desires matter as much as those of present tenants. . . . It is often
very difficult to know whether neighborhood stability is a source of strength or
122
stagnation, and whether mobility is a sign of vitality or decay.

The community as a whole also suffers by the incentives created by rent
control for long-term tenants to stay tenants, rather than become owners
with more of a stake in community affairs.123
HOUSING, at 134, 149 (1988) (questioning assertion that rent control has a negative impact on quality or supply of
rental housing, but noting that rent control has not reduced rents to affordable levels).
121
See supra note 88and accompanying text.
122
Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 771-72
(1989). Epstein goes on to observe that:
Economic accounts of efficiency have been attacked countless times because they leave out
the social equation fundamental concerns with justice and fairness that are thought to be an
inseparable part of our social life. How ironic that those tests are the only ones that direct
our attention toward the overall effects of the purported regulation – including the losses to
landlords and potential tenants, as well as to society at large – that the ‘communitarian’
approaches ignore.
Id. These are fair points, especially with respect to rent control. But the economic analysis advocated by Epstein
does not tell the whole story. The personal interest in possession of a home is not illusory, and economic theory
doesn’t seem to be able to fully value possession of home absent a voluntary transaction. Even in the presence of
a voluntary transaction, people tend to act in a manner that appears to be economically irrationally about their
homes, and this “irrational” overvaluation can be seen as an expression of the individual’s personal interest in the
home. See infra notes 144 - 147 Radin’s argument is a moral one, and fails in this context because it overvalues
the personal interest in the home while undervaluing the damage caused to the rest of the community by rent
control.
123
Traditional republican political theory supports favoritism of homeownership over renting because the
benefits and risks presented by ownership spur owners to be more involved and responsible citizens. See William
H. Simon, Social Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1356-58 (1991). This theoretical position is
supported by empirical evidence that homeowners in fact are more involved in community affairs than renters.
See infra notes 158 - 164 and accompanying text. Rent control provides something of a middle ground between
ownership and renting in this context, because tenants in a rent-controlled apartment are able to share some of the
fruits of community improvement where typical renters may get priced out of their homes as rental prices increase
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3. Underprotection of the Personal Interest In the Home
This sub-part examines areas of the law where the personal interest in
home is in some instances given too little protection. In family law, some
jurisdictions do not give sufficient weight to the unique nature of home in
allocating the home in divorce cases. In eminent domain law, the home is
underprotected both in the level of scrutiny given to government takings of
homes and in the amount of compensation awarded for those takings.
a.

Family Law

As discussed above, the modern conceptions of home, privacy and
family evolved together with the emergence of the bourgeois class in
Europe.124 Prior to that time, the home did not contain a family unit that
would be recognizable to the modern eye. During the Middle Ages,
children were sent away around age seven to become pages, apprentices or
servants, depending on their parents’ social position.125 Indeed, the concept
of childhood did not truly exist to the medieval mind. Rather, age
in an improving market. See FISCHEL, supra note 157, at 86; Simon, supra, at 1356-58. The rent-controlled
tenant, however, shares far less of the risk of community decline because the tenant can move to another location
without suffering the financial loss that would face a similarly-situated homeowner. Similarly, the rent-controlled
tenant shares less of the potential benefit of community improvement because the tenant does not share the
owner’s financial upside from community improvement. For example, a tenant in a rent-controlled apartment will
be less likely than an owner to participate heavily in local public school issues. If the tenant does become heavily
involved in improving the local public schools, the tenant will benefit by being able to send her children to better
schools and will be protected from being priced out of her home by the increase in property values caused by
school improvement. The tenant, however, will not share in the benefits of those increased values as would a
homeowner, because of the lack of equity ownership in a rented home. The traditional republican interest of
encouraging responsible citizenship would therefore continue to favor ownership over renting, whether rentcontrolled or not.
Simon adds concerns for social justice and for motivating people to remain in their community to traditional
republican theory to develop a social-republican theory of property. Simon’s social-republican model values
ownership because it places the risk of community decline on the owner, but is suspicious of ownership in part
because ownership allows the owner to the benefits of community improvements and to remove those benefits
from the community by selling the property. Simon acknowledges that rent control protects a tenant from losses
that his social-republican model would ideally place on members of the community, but argues that rent-control
encourages community by forcing the tenant to stay in place to share the benefits of community improvement. See
Simon, supra, at 1360-61 (“She can enjoy, without cost, increases in the value of the premises due, for example,
to improvements in the community, but she can enjoy them only in kind and must remain in place to do so.”).
Simon’s point about the inability of rent-controlled tenants to take the benefits of community improvement with
them when they move is an interesting one. But Simon’s social-republican model is an odd amalgam of
republican and communitarian ideals, recognizing that self-interest is a powerful motivator but going only
halfway because of a hostility to individual profit. On balance, ownership seems to be a superior motivator for
community involvement because the homeowner is exposed to all of the risks of community decline and more of
the benefits of community improvement than a rent-controlled tenant. A more important flaw in Simon’s theory,
however, is that it fails to confront the very real costs imposed by rent-control. Where Radin’s theory justifies
rent control with a moral claim about an individual’s personal connection to the home, Simon’s theory justifies
rent control with a moral claim about an individual’s connection to the community. See id. at 1361. But like
Radin’s theory based on the personal connection to the home, Simon’s community-based moral claim seems
insufficient to outweigh the harm that rent control imposes on the community as a whole and on individual
members of the community who are not beneficiaries of rent control. See supra notes 118 -125 and accompanying
text.
124
See supra notes 50 - 61and accompanying text.
125
RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50
, at 48 -49.
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groupings were divided into infants (those under age seven, who were still
dependent on maternal care) and adults.126 It was not until the development
of formal schooling in the Sixteenth Century that the concept of childhood
as a separate stage of life began to emerge,127 and the modern conception of
family started to emerge as children of the bourgeois began to live at home
during their school years.128
It therefore is not surprising that home and family are strongly linked as
contemporary cultural and psychological ideas.129 One area of law that
126

Id. at 48-49, 60; Aries, supra note 54, at 128, 411. As Aries explained:
In medieval society, the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to suggest that children
were neglected, forsaken or despised. The idea of childhood is not to be confused with
affection for children: it corresponds to an awareness of the particular nature of childhood,
that particular nature which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult. In
medieval society this awareness was lacking. That is why, as soon as the child could live
without the constant solicitude of his mother, his nanny or his cradle-rocker, he belonged to
adult society.

ARIES, supra note 54
, at 128.
127
RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50
, at 48 -49; ARIES, supra note 54,at 369.
128
RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50
, at 48 -49.
129
The link between family and home does not mean that a dwelling inhabited by a single person, or a nontraditional family, is any less of a home. Some critics have attacked the ideology of home as part of a larger
ideology of domesticity that has been used as a justification for discrimination against people who do not conform
to traditional roles. See Williams, supra note 2, at 328-29; Schnably, supra note 73,at 366-68. Schnably therefore
warns against “any simple blessing of the traditional home,” Schnably, supra note 73, at 367 (emphasis supplied),
and Williams argues that “[i]n its default mode,” the ideology of home “reinscribes traditional white middle class
gender roles.” Williams, supra, at 329. These are valid arguments for broadening our view of home life and
gender roles, but are not arguments for changing our legal concept of home. “Non-traditional” families following
non-traditional gender roles have homes, and should be entitled to the same benefits of home as traditional
families. Indeed, one goal of advocates for same-sex marriage is to give same-sex couples the same legal rights to
their homes as opposite-sex couples. See, e.g., Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DEN. U. L.
REV. 395 (1995); Ryan Nishimoto, Book Note, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J., 379, 390 (2003) (reviewing THE GAY
RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY LAW, (2002)); Liz Seaton, Debate Over Denial of Marriage Rights and
Benefits to Same-Sex Couples and their Children, 4 MARGINS 127, 142-43 (2004).
In an early-Twentieth-Century critique of the traditional home, Charlotte Perkins Gilman noted, among other
things, that the home could survive the absence of a woman who worked outside of the home. See GILMAN, supra
note 11
. But while critical of those aspects of the traditional ideal of home that relegated women to domestic
roles, Gillman was positive about the home generally: “The home in its essential nature is pure good, and in its
due development is progressively good; but it must change with society’s advance; and the kind of home that is
wholly beneficial in one century may be largely evil in another.” Id. at 8. The same holds true today –
conceptions of family and domesticity should not remain static, but the importance of home to families, however
defined, remains compelling.
A similarly misplaced criticism focuses on the archetypal single-family suburban home, upon which some
critics of the American ideology of home have focused their ire. See Williams, supra note 2, at 328-29; Schnably,
supra note 73
, at 366-68. Because of their focus on suburbia, these criticisms come across, at least in part, as
elitist polemics against a 1950’s Leave It To Beaver caricature of suburban life, where the suburbs are populated
exclusively by white, heterosexual families with a working father and stay-at-home mother. See Williams, supra
note 2, at 328-29; Schnably, supra note 73, at 366-68. (As part of his riff against suburbia, Schnably references
that hated institution, the suburban shopping mall. Schnably, supra note 73, at 368. Shopping malls have little, if
anything, to do with the broad concept of home discussed here. Schnably’s reference, however, certainly was an
effective academic rhetorical device – it is hard to imagine a cultural phenomenon that has provoked more
academic scorn than the mall.). This caricature of American suburbia is increasingly inaccurate, but more
importantly, criticism of a caricature of the traditional suburban home fails as a criticism of the larger concept of
home. Home as a concept is far broader than a detached suburban home inhabited by a traditional nuclear family.
“Home” includes urban apartments, both rented and owned, and many of the legal protections given to homes
apply as strongly to rented homes as to owned homes. See Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 81,at 365
(arguing that a residential tenancy is a “home” in the same sense as an owned dwelling, and should be given the
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squarely involves the relationship between family and home is the award of
a family home in divorce cases. Courts considering post-divorce property
distributions in cases where minor children are still living at home are likely
to view possession of a home as presenting complex issues beyond the
equitable financial division of the marital property, and to want to award the
home to the custodial parent to minimize the impact of the divorce on the
children.130 As one court, using language reflecting the personal possessory
interest in the home, explained:
The value of the family home to its occupants cannot be measured solely by its
value in the marketplace. The longer the occupancy, the more important these
non-economic factors become and the more traumatic and disruptive a move to a
new environment is to children whose roots have become firmly entwined in the
131
school and social milieu of the neighborhood.

Many jurisdictions, recognizing the potential negative impact on
children, give special treatment to the marital home in divorce cases.132
These jurisdictions do not categorically require an award of the marital
home to a custodial parent, nor should they – the complexity of property
distribution in divorce cases makes categorical rules undesirable.133 Rather,
these jurisdictions appropriately recognize the importance of the possessory
interest in the home by giving courts flexibility to consider the interest of
children in staying in their home in making a property award.134
same moral weight as an owned home). As noted above, “home” also includes the dwellings of individuals,
single parents, gays and lesbians and other “non-traditional” households.
As a result, Schnably’s and Williams’s arguments against the traditional conception of the home are not
compelling arguments against the concept of home generally. Certain conceptions of home deserve criticism, and
the ideology of home should not stand unquestioned. See, e.g., supra note 71 (discussing use of the ideology of
home by courts as a basis to decline to impose punishment for domestic abuse). But home as a whole is a
powerful and positive institution that is able to withstand criticism and change. It therefore is important to temper
criticism of the home with a recognition of its many positive characteristics. See Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a
Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45 STAN. L. REV. 409, 423-24 (1993) (taking a sympathetic view of
Schnably’s critique, but noting the difficulty presented by the tension between the positive and negative aspects of
the ideology of home).
130
See Martha F. Davis, The Marital Home: Equal or Equitable Distribution?, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089,
1089-90 (1983).
131
Duke v. Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155-56 (1980).
132
See Davis, supra note 130, at 1104-11 (discussing approaches taken by various jurisdictions to give
courts flexibility in awarding the marital home to a custodial spouse).
133
See id. Some jurisdictions apply something close to a categorical rule, where possession of the marital
home usually is given to the spouse who has custody of minor children though other interests may be considered
in exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Goldblum v. Goldblum, 754 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2003);
Sanney v. Sanney, 511 S.E.2d 865, 869 (W.Va. S. Ct. 1998); Cabrera v. Cabrera, 484 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1986); In re Anderson, 541 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Col. Ct. App. 1975). Courts applying this rule have made it
clear that the minor children’s interest in remaining in their home should generally be paramount. Goldblum, 754
N.Y.S.2d at 33 (noting that minor children had lived in marital home all or most of their lives and awarding
exclusive possession of marital home to custodial parent); Sanney, 511 S.E.2d at 869 (holding that the focus of the
inquiry “should be what will promote the best interests of the parties’ children”); Cabrera, 484 So. 2d at 1340
(“[T]he breakup of their parents’ marriage is . . . a severe trauma to young children; this additional physical and
psychological dislocation [from the family home] should not be imposed upon them unless there is a very good
reason indeed for doing so.” (alteration original; citation omitted)); Anderson, 541 P.2d at 1276 (noting that it was
“particularly important” to award custody to “the spouse having custody of the minor children” when the minor
child “was under the care of a psychiatrist [and] might be further disturbed by the dislocation if forced to move
away from the home, neighborhood school, and friends.”).
134
See Davis, supra note 130, at 1104-11.
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In other jurisdictions, however, mechanical rules requiring an equal
division of marital property may lead to the forced sale of the marital home
even in circumstances where a court otherwise believes it appropriate to
allocate the home to the custodial parent.135 While equal division of
property between the spouses may in the abstract be a laudatory goal, this
goal should not categorically outweigh the personal possessory interest of
minor children in staying in the marital home. By removing flexibility,
mandatory equal division rules result in the underprotection of the
possessory interest in the home.
b. Eminent Domain Law
Eminent domain gives the government a broad power to take private
property in return for just compensation. Governments often use the
eminent domain power to take homes, sometimes using the power to
condemn entire neighborhoods for large-scale development projects.
Recognition that the personal interest in the home is a real interest
deserving legal protection suggests that current eminent domain doctrine
should be modified in two respects. First, courts and legislatures should
impose higher levels of judicial scrutiny and additional process protections
to help ensure that homes taken by exercises of eminent domain are in fact
required for public use. Second, courts and legislatures should change their
approach to awards of just compensation, which currently focuses only on
the “fair market value” of the property, to take the personal interest in the
home into account.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London136
has brought the issue of government takings of homes into widespread
public discussion. Kelo involved New London’s attempt to use eminent
domain to take private homes and in turn transfer the property to a private
developer. The core legal issue in the case was whether the purported state
interest in the taking – spurring economic development – qualified as a
“public use” that justified the exercise of eminent domain. The Court
answered affirmatively, and allowed New London to proceed with the
takings.
In one sense the Court’s holding in Kelo was not at all surprising. In
two previous cases, the Court had held that eminent domain could be used
to take property and in turn transfer it to a private party so long as the taking

135
See id. at 1097-1101 (discussing effect of equal division rules on allocation of the marital home). As
their name implies, equal division rules require marital property to be divided equally between the spouses. If (as
is typical) the marital home is the largest marital asset, equal division will often require the sale of the marital
home to achieve financial equality in the distribution between the two spouses. See id.
136
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
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served a public purpose.137 The Court also made it clear in those cases that
courts should give great deference to legislative determinations of what
constitutes a public purpose.138 Kelo therefore can be seen as simply
following this trend of a flexible interpretation of “public use” and judicial
deference to the legislative branch.
In another sense, however, Kelo is both surprising and disappointing.
Neither of the Court’s leading pre-Kelo precedents on public use had
concerned the involuntary taking of a person’s home.139 Kelo therefore
offered the Court the opportunity to at least consider applying a higher level
of scrutiny to the taking of homes. The Opinion of the Court, however, did
not even discuss the possibility that homes could be treated differently than
other types of property in the eminent domain context. In light of the litany
of areas where homes are given special legal treatment discussed in the
prior portions of this Article, the Court’s failure to address the unique nature
of the home is striking.
Because of substantial public backlash against Kelo, state and federal
legislators have begun to consider statutory responses that would restrict the
scope of what constitutes a public use in the eminent domain context. Most
of the proposed statutes seek to make blanket alterations in the allowable
scope of public use, either by expressly prohibiting the kind of economic
development taking that was involved in Kelo or by prohibiting courts from
interpreting “public use” to mean “public purpose.”140 These approaches,
however, may paint with too broad a brush. Negative public reaction to
Kelo appears to be focused on fears that homes could be taken for
commercial development, and the taking of homes presents very different
interests than the taking of other types of property. In the case of a home,
the owner has a strong personal interest in maintaining possession; in the
case of commercial property or undeveloped land, the owner’s interest is
likely to be fungible.141
Legislatures therefore should consider focusing their statutory response
137
See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 3335 (1954).
138
Id.
139
Midkiff involved a unique situation where eminent domain was being used to transfer ownership to a
rented home from the landlord to the tenant. 467 U.S. at 232-33. As a result, the resident of the home (the tenant)
was not being displaced by the exercise of eminent domain. Berman involved the taking of a department store as
part of an urban renewal program. 348 U.S. at 31. The issue of the taking of homes to transfer to a private
developer had been presented in the notorious Poletown case, where the Supreme Court of Michigan allowed
Detroit to condemn an entire neighborhood and displace thousands of residents from their homes to clear land for
the construction of a General Motors plant. Poletown Neighborhood Counsel v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455
(Mich. 1981). Poletown was recently overruled in Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), though
like Kelo, Wayne did not consider the possibility that homes could be treated differently than other types of
property in the eminent domain context.
140
[Citations will be added for this paragraph as the legislative response develops in the late summer; so far
legislation has been proposed at the federal level and in at least twenty-five states].
141
See supra notes 82 - 83and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between personal and fungible
property).
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to Kelo on giving additional protection to homes while maintaining the
flexibility of municipalities to use eminent domain more broadly in other
contexts. Additional protection for homes could take several forms.
Legislatures could restrict the scope of public use by, for example,
prohibiting the taking of homes for purposes of economic development.
The personal possessory interest in homes, however, justifies giving
additional protection to homes even for non-controversial uses such as
roads and schools. Legislatures therefore could permit municipalities to
take a home only after making a finding that the property could not be
purchased voluntarily and that there was no reasonable alternative course of
action that would achieve the same public goal without taking the home.
Legislatures could take other steps to encourage municipalities to take
homes only as a last resort, for example by requiring the payment of a
premium above fair market value as compensation for taking a home.142
Independent of the issue of discouraging the taking of homes, the
current compensation standard for the taking of homes warrants
reconsideration.
American eminent domain law presently limits
compensation for takings to fair market value, or “‘what a willing buyer
would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the time of the taking.”143 This
standard, of course, is an artifice in any exercise of eminent domain,
because the seller is by definition not willing to part with the property
voluntarily. As Judge Posner has observed,
[M]arket value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his
property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.
Many owners are “intramarginal” meaning that because of relocation costs,
sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the property for their
particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than its
market value (i.e., it is not “for sale”). Such owners are hurt when the government
takes their property and gives them just its market value in return. The taking in
effect confiscates the additional (call it “personal”) value that they obtain from the
144
property . . . .
142

See infra notes 143 - 155 and accompanying text.
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (quoting United States v. Miller, 317
U.S. 369, 374 (1943); see also JACK L. KNETSCH, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPENSATION: COMPULSORY
ACQUISITION AND OTHER LOSSES 37 (1983) (noting that in most jurisdictions owners are not compensated for
their full reserve value in their property).
144
Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (emphasis
original). Knetsch makes a similar observation:
143

When property is taken in this manner, owners cannot hold out for a sum that at least
compensates them for what they feel they are giving up, as would be the case in a voluntary
sale. . . . Most owners are unwilling to sell their holdings at the prevailing market prices,
not because they are irrational or unreasonable, but simply because they place a higher
value on the particular properties than other people do. . . . As current owners have
previously selected their property from among others available to them and have likely
increased their degree of preference through familiarity with the neighborhood and
emotional attachments, in most cases owners will view their holding as more valuable than
any similarly priced but less familiar substitute that could be purchased.
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Undervaluation of the taken property may be less of a problem when the
property in question is undeveloped or commercial.145 But when the taken
property is a home, market value compensation fails to compensate the
owner for the personal interest in the home.
The Supreme Court implicitly has recognized that market value
compensation fails to fully compensate the property owner, but has stuck
with the market value standard because of the “serious practical difficulties
in assessing the worth an individual places on particular property at a given
time.”146 Placing a monetary value on the personal interest in the home is
admittedly difficult,147 though not insurmountable.148 Objective measures
could be added to the fair market value of taken homes by either courts or
legislatures. Homeowners could be reimbursed for reasonable moving
expenses149 or reasonable attorney’s fees if successful in contesting the
government’s valuation of their property. Further, taken homes could be
compensated at a fixed premium over fair market value, or a premium tied
to a sliding scale that increased with the length of residence in the home.150
Such a premium admittedly would be arbitrary (though a premium based on
length of residence would be less arbitrary than a flat premium),151 but
would be no more arbitrary than the present system of fair market value
compensation. Each of these approaches would come closer to making the
homeowner whole. They also would provide incentives for governments to
obtain property through voluntary market transactions rather than through
eminent domain, and to take homes only when truly needed for the public
interest.152
KNETSCH, supra note 143, at 36, 39, 40.
145
Even with undeveloped or commercial property, the property at issue may have unique value to the
owner; in such a case, the owner is undercompensated by market value compensation.
146
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511.
147
See KNETSCH, supra note 143, at 38, 49-53 (discussing objections to compensating owners for the
personal interest in their property and responses to those objections); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of
Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82-85 (1986); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736-37 (1973). As Judge Posner put it:
Many people place a value on their homes that exceeds its market price. But a standard of
subjective value in eminent domain cases, while the correct standard as a matter of
economic principle, would be virtually impossible to administer because of the difficulty of
proving . . . that the house was worth more the owner than the market price.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 531 (6th ed. 2003)
148
For example, Robert Ellickson has suggested that a system of legislatively-defined schedules could be set
up to award people additional compensation beyond market value. See Ellickson, supra note 147, at 736-37.
149
Federal law provides for payment of relocation expenses and other replacement costs for people displaced
by the acquisition of property for a federal project. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622, 4623.
150
English law at one time awarded a customary ten percent premium in all takings cases to “soften the blow
of compulsory acquisition.” KEITH DAVIES, THE LAW OF COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND COMPENSATION, at 136
(4th ed. 1984) (quoting Lord Denning in Harvey v. Crawley Dev. Corp., 1 QB 485 (1957)).
151
Length of residence is a significant component of a person’s connection to a home people’s ties to their
homes but may be in particular circumstances be outweighed by other factors. See Fried, supra note 90,at 154 -55.
Length of residence therefore is not a perfect measure of personal connection to a home.
152
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, the courts (whether on their own initiative or pursuant to
legislative mandate) could tackle the difficulty of subjectively valuing the
personal interest in the home. In other contexts, such as personal injury and
emotional distress, the law often confronts hard issues of quantifying
damages when necessary to fully compensate an injured person.
Particularly where there is a Constitutional mandate that compensation be
just,153 there is a strong argument that the courts should be willing to accept
the difficulties of fully compensating property owners for the personal
interest in their homes. This said, the uniqueness of each person’s
relationship to their home may make principled compensation decisions
impossible.
III. FREEHOLDS, LEASEHOLDS AND CITIZENSHIP
In many of the legal contexts considered in the foregoing sections, there
is no apparent reason to treat owned homes differently than rented homes.
In all of the issues relating to security, autonomy and privacy considered in
Part I, a resident’s interest in the home is the same regardless of whether the
home is owned or rented. The landlord-tenant issues discussed in Part II,
however, do involve disparate treatment of owners and renters. Implicit in
the discussion of just-cause eviction statutes and residential rent control is
the fact that ordinarily tenants lose their right to possess their home at the
expiration of their tenancy. In contrast, an owner’s right to an owned home
expires (absent an unusual circumstance such as an exercise of eminent
domain) only when the owner voluntarily transfers ownership of the
home.154 Generally speaking, this disparate treatment makes perfect sense
because it is simply a reflection of the inherent difference between a
freehold estate of unlimited duration and a leasehold estate of limited
duration. An owner owns, and a renter rents.
Beyond the inherent differences between freeholds and leaseholds,
favoritism of ownership may be justified by a desire to encourage good
citizenship. As William Fischel notes in The Homevoter Hypothesis, there
is hard evidence that homeowners are “more likely [than renters] to
participate in school board meetings, vote in local elections, and otherwise
participate in community affairs.”155 Results of national and local surveys
show that homeowners vote more often in local elections than renters – in
153

See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The loss of a home to a mortgage foreclosure can be seen as involuntary at the time of foreclosure, but the
homeowner voluntarily gave up sole ownership of the property when the mortgage was first executed.
155
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 12. “Even after controlling for other economic and demographic differences
between homeowners and renters, [studies have] found that homeowners were more conscientious citizens and
were more effective in providing community amenities.” Id.; see also Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House
on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1354-57
(2000).
154
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one national survey, by a 77 percent to 52 percent margin.156 The majority
of Americans own homes, and for most of these homeowners, their home is
their single most valuable asset.157 Fischel’s thesis is that the importance of
preserving the value of their homes is the key factor that motivates
homeowners to be more active citizens, and that homeowners will generally
act (and in the political arena, vote) in a manner consistent with preserving
the value of their homes.158 Hence Fischel’s invented term, homevoter,
which reflects American homeowners’ tendency to vote on local matters
with the value of their homes in mind.159 Aside from its importance to legal
policy issues, the strong effect that homeownership has on local political
behavior also reinforces the view that value is a significant component of
156
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 80-81 (“Nearly every study has shown that renters participate in local affairs in
disproportionately low numbers compared to homeowners. In a national survey, 77 percent of homeowners said
that they voted in local elections during the period 1984-1992, while only 52 percent of the renters did. Evidence
from individual cities confirms the national data. . . . Asset ownership matters.”). Beyond their political
involvement, homeowners will also tend to make better neighbors because they are less likely to act
opportunistically to the detriment of other members of the community because “the neighbor they might spite
today is the neighbor they might need tomorrow.” Id. at 203. The net effect of homeowner behavior, in the
political arena and otherwise, is that having homeowners rather than renters as neighbors has raised home values
in various cities. Id. at 46.
157
As Fischel has noted,

The importance of a home for the typical owner can hardly be overstated. Two-thirds of all
homes are owner occupied. For the great majority of these homeowners, the equity in their
home is the most important savings they have. Data from 1990 surveys show that “median
housing equity is more than 11 times as large as median liquid assets among all
homeowners; even for homeowners over 65, that ratio was still more than 3 to 1.”
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 4. Homes are not unique in being valuable, and many other types of property hold
significant value, but the value of homes is profoundly important to homeowners. Ownership and value are both
components of many people’s psychological connection with their homes, Smith, supra note 7, at 36-37, to the
point where some people perceive a dwelling that is not owned as not-homelike. Id. at 42 (“A quarter of the
respondents mentioned the lack of ownership, either physical or psychological, as indicative of a non-home.”). It
therefore is not surprising that most Americans are focused, consciously or unconsciously, on preserving the value
of their homes, or that their elected representatives act accordingly. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 1, passim
(discussing political impact of homeownership).
158
Id. Homeowners behave differently than owners of other types of assets because homeowners have large
portions of their wealth – for many Americans, more than half of their net worth – in their home. As a result,
homeowners cannot diversify the risk of loss to their homes as they can with other types of investments, and any
loss has the potential to have a very significant impact on the homeowner’s financial position. Id. at 74-75.
159
Fischel’s evidence does not lead to the dogmatic conclusion that homeownership should always be
favored over renting, or that everyone should be encouraged to own a home. Fischel himself notes that high
homeownership rates may lead to higher unemployment rates because the lack of a rental market can interfere
with the job market, and that homevoters acting in their narrow self interest of preserving their home values tend
to support land use restrictions that lead to inefficient land use and suburban sprawl. See id. at 87, 232. It is also
worth keeping in mind the view of one commentator writing at the end of the Great Depression:
Much sentimentality has been developed around the idea of home ownership. Civic virtue,
the sanctity of the family, the spiritual influence of the old homestead, the lasting value of
the family counsel held around the fireside, seem to be the exclusive privilege of the home
owner. Nothing is said by political orators, preachers, and crooners about the tragedy of
mortgage foreclosures or overdue tax bills.
CAROL ARONOVICI, HOUSING THE MASSES 120-21 (1939). More recent legal reforms such as fair lending laws
and the right of redemption in foreclosure, see supra note 98and accompanying text, have mitigated some of the
concerns expressed by Aronovici, but our enthusiasm for home ownership should at least be tempered by the
reminder that housing markets sometimes go down as well as up.
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people’s psychological relationship to their homes.160
The encouragement of political participation through property
ownership has long been a significant strand in American republican
thought,161 and homevoter republicanism is a strong theoretical justification
for government policies that give preference to home ownership over home
renting. This said, the benefits of political participation and good
citizenship do not alone justify policies that favor homeownership. Rather,
the benefits of homeownership must be balanced against the social costs of
any given policy.
A focus on home ownership and citizenship is reflected in the favorable
treatment given to homes in the Internal Revenue Code, most notably by the
deduction allowed for interest on mortgages on homes and by the large
exemption given to capital gains realized on the sale of homes.162 The
favored treatment given to home ownership has been both widely criticized
and widely defended on a number of grounds.163 One defense of the current
160

See supra note 157 (discussing value and ownership in context of psychology of the home).
See Simon, supra note 123, at 1356-58 (discussing republican arguments that justify favoritism towards
homeowners); see also supra notes 121 - 123 and accompanying text (discussing republican issues in the context
of residential rent control). At least since the emergence of a large urban underclass in industrial Nineteenth
Century America, home has featured prominently in debates about poverty and social conflict. Reformers and
politicians in the late Nineteenth Century focused on the importance of a stable, safe home to the development of
children and on the good citizenship that would result from home ownership by the poor. Home ownership by the
poor was also seen as a potential antidote for socialism, anarchism and social disorder, acting as a strong
conservative influence by giving the poor a stake in society. JAN COHN, THE PALACE OR THE POORHOUSE: THE
AMERICAN HOUSE AS A CULTURAL SYMBOL, 146-47, 214 (1979); see also PERIN, supra note 2, at 71-72
(discussing social value of homeownership). Cohn quotes remarks by President Hoover to the Conference on
Home Building and Home Ownership that encapsulate the ideal of the home as a source of good citizenship:
161

Every one of you here is impelled by the high ideal and aspiration that each family may
pass their days in the home which they own; that they may nurture it as theirs; that it may
be their castle in all that exquisite sentiment which it surrounds with the sweetness of
family life. This aspiration penetrates the heart of our national well-being. It makes for
happier married life, it makes for better children, it makes for confidence and security, it
makes for the courage to meet the battle of life, it makes for better citizenship. There can
be no fear for a democracy or for self-government or for liberty and freedom from home
owners no matter how humble they may be. . . . Probably nothing creates greater stability in
government than a wide distribution of property ownership on the part of the people
interested in that government. . . . It is doubtful whether democracy is possible where
tenants overwhelmingly outnumber home owners. For democracy is not a privilege; it is a
responsibility, and human nature rarely volunteers to shoulder responsibility, but has to be
driven by the whip of necessity. The need to protect and guard the home is the whip that
has proved, beyond all others, efficacious in driving men to discharge the duties of selfgovernment.
COHN, supra, at 237-38 (quoting Home Ownership, Income and Types of Dwellings, Vol. IV of the Reports of the
President’s Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership (1931)). The desire to facilitate home ownership
by the poor, however, ran headlong into America’s strong strain of individualism and aversion to devaluing the
home as a symbol of honest labor and thrift by making it a subject of charity. As a result, the American ideal
“was that not every man deserved a home, but that every man deserved the opportunity to work for a home.” Id.,
at 146.
162
See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (mortgage interest deduction); I.R.C. § 121 (capital gains exclusion for principal
residence).
163
See, e.g., Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership
Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157 (2005); Mann, supra note 155; Joseph W. Trefzger, Why Homeownership
Deserves Special Tax Treatment, 26 REAL EST. L.J. 340 (1998); William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic
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system is that it encourages homeownership, and therefore encourages good
citizenship.164 Conversely, a criticism is that it unjustifiably subsidizes the
housing costs of homeowners at the expense of home renters.165
Resolving the complex tax policy issues presented by the favored
treatment of homeownership is beyond the scope of this Article. The tax
issue, however, is a good illustration of the potential significance of
republican arguments for government policies that favor home ownership
over home rental – encouraging active citizenship is a factor that supports
favored treatment of ownership over rental, but is not one that should
necessarily trump competing arguments. It remains a testament of the
importance of homeownership to voter behavior, however, that the despite
the interest it creates in academia, serious political discussion of the
abolition of the mortgage interest deduction remains a practical
impossibility.
CONCLUSION
Charlotte Perkins Gilman observed that home “in its essential nature is
pure good.”166 The positive characteristics of home, however, may be
outweighed in specific circumstances by competing interests that also
deserve legal protection. Each of the three Parts of this Article discussed
ideological conceptions of home and law that lend themselves to absolute
application: in Part I, home as castle; in Part II, Radin’s suggestion that the
personal interest in the home should always trump competing fungible
interests; and in Part III, the republican ideal that homeownership should
always be encouraged. The central conclusion of this Article is that while
each of these conceptions has strengths, legal issues involving in the home
remain contextual and should not be resolved by blanket application of
ideological principles.
In many circumstances – particularly those involving home as a source
of individual autonomy and privacy – the unique nature of home often
justifies special legal treatment. In others – such as homestead exemptions
Distortions of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 43 (1996); Julia Patterson Forrester,
Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity
Financing, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 373, 406-409 (1994); Joseph Snoe, My Home, My Debt: Remodeling the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 80 Ky. L. Rev. 431, 451-79 (1992). Because a large majority of Americans own
their homes, eliminating the mortgage interest deduction entirely seems to be a political impossibility. It may be
politically possible, however, to make the mortgage interest deduction more progressive by reducing the cap on
the amount of mortgage principal for which homeowners can take a deduction. Reducing the cap from its current
level of $1.1 million to, say, $400,000, would increase the tax burden on a small number of very wealthy
homeowners while preserving a substantial benefit for all homeowners (including those with mortgages exceeding
the cap, who would still qualify for the exemption on interest from $400,000 of their mortgage).
164
See, e.g., Snider, supra note 163, at 176; Trefzger, supra note 163, at 346; Forrester, supra note 163, at
407 & n.185.
165
See, e.g., Mathias, supra note 163, passim; Snoe, supra note 163, at 467-71.
166
GILMAN, supra note 11
, at 8.
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and rent control – interests in the home are given too much protection. In
still others – notably equal division rules in family law and certain aspects
of eminent domain law – the home is given insufficient protection. In all of
these circumstances, striking the correct balance requires looking past the
broad idea that homes are unique and special, and focusing instead on the
particular aspects of home that are relevant to the issue at hand.
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